Difference between revisions of "Ken Alibek"

From Self-sufficiency
Jump to: navigation, search
(→‎Work at Biopreparat-Moscow)
 
m (1 revision: 2001 anthrax attacks)
 
(No difference)

Latest revision as of 16:22, 27 September 2010

File:Alibek.jpg
Dr Ken Alibek

Colonel Kanatjan Alibekov (Russian: Канатжан Алибеков; Kazakh: Қанатжан Әлібеков; born 1950) — known as Dr. Ken Alibek since 1992 — is a former Soviet physician, scientist and biological warfare (BW) expert. He rose rapidly in the ranks of the Red Army to become the First Deputy Director of Biopreparat where he oversaw a vast program of BW facilities. In 1992 he defected to the United States, has become an American citizen, and makes his living as a biodefense consultant, speaker, and entrepreneur. He has actively participated in the development of biodefense strategy for the U.S. government, and has repeatedly advised the U.S. Congress and other governments on biotechnology issues. He is Chief Executive Officer of AFG Biosolutions Inc. (USA) and President and CEO of MaxWell Biocorporation, LLC (USA)[1].

Biography

Youth and early career

Alibek was born Kanatjan Alibekov in Kauchuk, in the Kazakh SSR of the Soviet Union (in present day Kazakhstan) and grew up in Almaty, the republic's former capital.

His exceptional academic performance while studying military medicine at the Tomsk Medical Institute and his family’s noted patriotism, led to his selection to work for Biopreparat, the secret BW program overseen by the Soviet Union’s Council of Ministers. His first assignment (1975) was to the Eastern European Branch of the Institute of Applied Biochemistry (IAB) near Omutninsk, a combined pesticide production facility and reserve BW production plant intended for activation in a time of war. At Omutninsk, Alibekov mastered the art and science of formulating and evaluating nutrient media and cultivation conditions for the optimization of microbial growth. It was here that he expanded his medical school laboratory skills into the complex skill set required for industrial level production of microorganisms and their toxins.[2]

After less than a year at Omutninsk, Alibekov was transferred to the Siberian Branch of the IAB near Berdsk. With the assistance of a colleague, he designed and constructed a microbiology research and development laboratory that worked on techniques to optimize production of biological formulations. After several promotions over a short period of time, Alibekov was transferred back to Omutninsk where he quickly rose to the position of Deputy Director. He was soon transferred to the Kazakhstan Scientific and Production Base in Stepnogorsk (another reserve BW facility) to become the new Director of that facility. Officially, he was Deputy Director of the Progress Scientific and Production Association, a manufacturer of fertilizer and pesticide. At Stepnogorsk, Alibekov created the most efficient industrial scale assembly line for biological formulations. In a time of war, the assembly line could be used to produce weaponized anthrax. Continued successes in science and biotechnology led to more promotions which resulted in a transfer to Moscow.[3]

Work at Biopreparat-Moscow

In Moscow, Alibekov began his service as Deputy Chief of the Biosafety Directorate at Biopreparat. He was later promoted (1988) to First Deputy Director of Biopreparat where he not only oversaw the biological weapons facilities but also the significant number of pharmaceutical facilities that produced antibiotics, vaccines, sera, and interferon for the public. Though the time he had available was short, he took this additional responsibility to public health seriously.

In response to a Spring 1990 announcement that the Ministry of Medical and Microbiological Industry was to be reorganized, Alibekov drafted and forwarded through channels a memo to President Gorbachev proposing the cessation of Biopreparat’s BW work. Though the President approved the proposal, an additional paragraph had been secretly inserted into Alibekov’s draft resulting in a presidential decree that not only ordered the end of Biopreparat’s BW work but also required them to remain prepared for future production.

Though disappointed by the double dealing, Alibekov used his position at Biopreparat and the authority granted to him by the first part of the decree to begin destruction of the BW program. He also negotiated a concurrent appointment to a Biopreparat facility called Biomash. Biomash designed and produced technical equipment for microbial cultivation and testing. He planned to increase the amount of product sent to the hospitals and the civilian medical laboratories beyond the 40% allocated at the time.[4]

Defection to the United States

Alibekov was subsequently placed in charge of intensive preparations for inspections of Soviet biological facilities by a joint American and British delegation. While participating in the subsequent Soviet inspection of American facilities, his growing suspicion that the United States did not have an offensive BW program was confirmed before his return to Russia (the Soviet Union dissolved while he was in the US). Not long after his return from the US, Alibekov resigned from both the Soviet Army and from Biopreparat and secretly emigrated with his family to the US in the fall of 1992, despite being forbidden to do so by the KGB.[5]

Dr. Ken Alibek adds: “Long before my emigration, I resigned from the Soviet Army, left my administrative and scientific positions in Moscow, refused to accept a Russian citizenship, informed Russian security officials that I would be leaving for the United States, became jobless for more than 9 months and, after I got my parents’ blessing, I left the former Soviet Union (it was not Russia). I do not think it can be considered defection even though Russian security officials did not want me to go overseas. But it was a different time, I was not a Russian citizen and they could not have done anything officially. Only after that I emigrated with all my family”

Since moving to the US, Alibekov — who simplified his name to Ken Alibek — has provided the government with a detailed accounting of the former Soviet BW program and has testified before the U.S. Congress on numerous occasions (see also Sverdlovsk anthrax leak). He has provided guidance to the intelligence, policy, national security, and medical communities and has returned to the pure biomedical research that captured his interest as a medical student. He was the impetus behind the creation of an innovative biodefense graduate education program at George Mason University (GMU) that drew students from across the country and has served in the program as both a Distinguished Professor of Medical Microbiology and as the Director of Education. He also developed the plans for GMU’s biosafety level three (BSL-3) research facility and was instrumental in obtaining $40 million dollars of grants from the federal and state governments for construction of the facility.[6]

In 1999, Alibek published an autobiographical account of his work in the Soviet Union and his defection.[7]

Pharmaceutical entrepreneur

On 11 March 2006, Alibek announced that, owing to substantive differences between himself and GMU over the future of the Graduate Programs in Biodefense, he would not be teaching classes beyond the Spring semester and that he was resigning from GMU effective 27 August 2006. In an agreement with his students, he volunteered his time from Spring 2006 through Spring 2007 to help them earn their doctoral degrees.

Alibek is currently the President, Chief Scientific Officer and Chief Executive Officer at AFG Biosolutions, Inc in Gaithersburg, Maryland [8] where he and his scientific team continue their development of advanced solutions for antimicrobial immunity. Motivated by the lack of affordable anti-cancer therapies available in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, AFG is using Alibek’s biotechnology experience to plan, build, and manage a new pharmaceutical production facility designed specifically to address this problem. Alibek created this new pharmaceutical production company, MaxWell Biocorporation (MWB), in 2006 and serves as its CEO and President. Based in Washington, D.C., with several subsidiaries and affiliates in the United States and Ukraine, MWB’s main goal is said to be the creation of a new, large-scale, high-technology, ultra-modern pharmaceutical fill-and-finish facility in Ukraine. Off-patent generic pharmaceuticals produced at this site are supposed to target severe oncological, cardiological, immunological, and chronic infectious diseases. MWB is said to be the biggest and most modern pharmaceutical production facility in all of the former Soviet Union. It is intended to serve as the flagship of a larger healthcare complex at a campus just outside the Ukrainian capital city of Kiev in the town of Boryspil. Construction of the Boryspil facility began in April 2007 and was completed in March 2008; initial production is scheduled to begin in 2008. The stated intention is that high quality pharmaceuticals will be produced and become an affordable source of therapy for millions of underprivileged who currently have no therapeutic options.

Biographical chronology

  • 2008 Chairman, Department of Medical Biotechnology and Immunotherapy, the Institute of Ecology and Medicine
  • 2007 Professor of the Institute of Ecology and Medicine, Ukraine and Lecturer for the National University of Ukraine
  • 2006 CEO and President of MaxWell Biocorporation LLC (USA/Ukraine)
  • Served on over 35 doctoral committees (PhD) and two Doctor of Sciences committees both in Russia and the United States
  • From 2000 to 2006 BBC’s “Historic Figures”
  • 2005 Lecturer for “Russian-American Security Program of Harvard University’s John Kennedy Center for Government Studies
  • 2005 Senior Fellow, Center for Advanced Defense Studies, Washington DC
  • 2004 Outstanding faculty member, George Mason University
  • 2003 Consultant to the government of Singapore on BW threat and defense
  • 2002 Distinguished and tenured professor of Medical Microbiology and Immunology, George Mason University
  • Multiple written appreciations from various branches of the United States government for continued support in the field of national security
  • Multiple invitations to speak for national and international symposia and conferences
  • 2002 Business Forward Magazine Award: “Deals of the Year” for one of the biggest federal contracts for small businesses
  • 2001 President of AFG Biosolutions, Inc. ( formerly “Advanced Biosystems, Inc”)
  • 2000 Corporate vice president of Analex Corporation
  • 2000 Authored the “Biohazard” book – published in more than 20 countries including USA, UK, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Taiwan, etc.
  • 1999 Chief Scientist of Analex Corporation (formerly Hadron, Inc)
  • 1994 Barkley Medal - awarded by the U.S. government in recognition of distinguished public service and contribution to world peace
  • 1990 Colonel of Soviet Armed Forces (May 5)
  • 1990 Doctor of Sciences in Biotechnology
  • 1988 First deputy director of Main Directorate Biopreparat – chief scientist of BW threat program
  • 1987 Director of scientific directorate of Main Directorate Biopreparat
  • 1984 Medal “For Battlefield Services” of Soviet Armed Forces
  • 1984 PhD in Medical Microbiology
  • 1983 Military commander of BW threat research and development base, USSR
  • 1975 Doctor of Medicine – Military Medicine

Some observers have questioned the scientific credibility of Alibek's recent work and his motivations[9]:

Here we provide with the main statements from the article (with some additional information published by some self-proclaimed experts) and Dr. Alibek and his colleagues' responses:

  • In a September 2003 news release, Alibek and another professor suggested, based on their laboratory research, that smallpox vaccination might increase a person's immunity to HIV. The work was touted by GMU but was rejected after peer-review by the Journal of the American Medical Association and Lancet and is no longer being pursued. According to smallpox expert and former White House science advisor Donald A. Henderson, "This is a theory that… does not hold up at all, and it does not make any sense from a biologic point of view…This idea ... was straight off the wall. I would put no credence in it at all."
  • Alibek and colleagues have sought to develop a product that would protect against an array of deadly viruses and bacteria, rather than just a single organism. In his lab, mice had survived doses of smallpox and anthrax. His "cocktail approach" -- mixing more than one drug with other ingredients—was touted at news conferences in 2002 and 2004 by U.S. Representative H. James Saxton (R-N.J.), perhaps Alibek’s major government benefactor, as "a potential new defense against bioterrorism". But this unconventional scientific approach is very difficult to assess accurately and has not withstood scientific peer review.
  • According to Dr. Alibek these people should have read peer-reviewd scientific articles and commercial literature on this principle of antiviral and antibacterial protection. One of the principles o f this protective method he published in the peer-reviewed CDC’s journal Emerging Infectious Diseases in the Letter to Editor Biodefense shield and avian influenza, 2006, May, 12 (5): 873-5. He also says that while here in the United States we spend time for these arguments, new preparations using the same principle have already appeared on the pharmaceutical markets of European countries for protecting against viral and bacterial infections. For example, an intranasal preparation based on the same principle offered by Dr. Alibek is being sold under the name IRS - 19® (it was developed and manufactured by Solvay pharmaceutical company). Currently, there are a large number of companies in the US that explore the same approach in antiviral defense. However, it is very likely that the participation of amateurs and other types of non-professionals in these scientific discussions did not (and will not) let this new biodefense and epidemic prevention approach to be introduced in the USA. A number of pharmaceutical preparations based on this and close the same approaches are growing dramatically in the world but not in the United States.
  • Alibek has used his notoriety to promote "Dr. Ken Alibek's Immune System Support Formula," sold over the Internet. The concoction of vitamins, minerals, and a proprietary bacterial mix — a month's supply of which cost $59.95 plus tax and shipping — will purportedly “bolster the immune system”.[10]
  • In a number of interviews to various media outlets Dr. Alibek said that he never benefited from these sales and never had any commercial interests which could have resulted from these sales over the Internet.
  • In 2002 it was alleged by three independent investigators, Michael Ruppert, Leonard Horowitz, and Stewart Webb, that Alibek should be regarded as a chief suspect in the 2001 Anthrax scare. "Dr. Alibekov's interrogation and lie detection at Hadron's Advanced Biosystems," Ruppert advised, "may not only solve the anthrax mailings mystery, but also shed light on the recent untimely and inexplicable deaths of several biological weapons experts." Investigators cited Alibek's close ties with pharmaceutical companies Hadron and DynCorp, which made windfall profits as a result of the scare. After pursuing and unsuccessful case against Stephen Hatfill for the crimes, the FBI subsequently was on the verge of arresting Bruce Ivins when, on July 29, 2008, he committed suicide.
  • According to biodefense experts who conducted the Anthrax scare investigation the information about Dr. Alibek's involement is slanderous and these "experts" deserve no serious attention. Dr. Alibek thinks that the “three independent experts” slandered him because he constantly criticized their conspiracy theory about “recent untimely and inexplicable deaths of several biological weapons experts” in his interviews to a number of media outlets. According to Dr. Alibek, the people mentioned by these "three experts" (including Dr. Pasechnik who was a biochemist) had no biodefense expertise and the deaths of these people were either from natural causes or resulted from accidents. Moreover, Hadron was not a phrmaceutical company and it could not benefit from the scare. Dr. Alibek never had ties with DynCorp company (as well as with any other pharmaceutical company) which is not a pharmaceutical company either. He says that all these things came from the "inflamed minds" of some "experts" who live in the strange self-created worlds of government conspiracy.
  • Alibek resigned as executive director of GMU’s National Center for Biodefense and Infectious Diseases in September 2006, despite his position as a tenured and distinguished professor. A University spokeswoman confirmed his resignation, but declined to comment on the circumstances surrounding his departure. According to a 2007 Los Angeles Times article, “Alibek said the college administration had grown displeased with his company's role in sharing grant-funded research. The university, he said, requested that he dismantle or leave AFG Biosolutions. He chose to resign from George Mason.”[11]
  • That is what Dr. Alibek said to one of the reporters who interviewed him on this issue. “It was a very difficult decision for me to make. I was the National Center’s director, a distinguished and tenured professor with one of the highest compensations possible. I was awarded a title of outstanding faculty of the university. In 2005 I was offered even a much higher salary if I dismantle the company I have established a long before I came to the university and would transfer all the projects to the university. I could not betray my scientists who believed in me and would lose their jobs if the company was to be dismantled. I chose to stay with the company but, as the result of my decision, I lost all monetary and social security benefits I had at the university. I do not feel sorry for it since many of my scientists had a chance to continue working on interesting scientific projects and to support their spouses and children for a long time afterwards”
  • Some experts question Alibek's characterizations of the bioterrorism threats. Some have asserted that Alibek has a vested interest in raising fears as he profits from government contracts related to countering bioterrorism. Retired Army major general and physician Philip K. Russell, while impressed by Alibek’s knowledge of the former Soviet Union's production of anthrax, "began to think that Ken was more fanciful than precise in some of his recollections" where the genetically engineered smallpox was concerned. Russell also remarked with regard to “…the issue of putting Ebola genes into smallpox virus. That was viewed, at least in many of our minds, as somewhat fanciful. And probably not true."[12]
  • According to Dr. Alibek there is a significant problem for many US scientists because they do not read articles written in some other languages. In order to help understand the problem related to smallpox studies he published a review article Smallpox: a disease and a weapon in a peer-reviewed journal International Journal of Infectious Diseases, 2004, Oct; 8 Suppl 2:S3-8 where he described all published research (with specific methodologies used by those researchers) in non-English scientific journals. He added that there was no personal benefit for his work in biodefense fields since for many years he mainly worked on NIH-granted projects and the projects from commercial companies which had nothing in common with biodefense. These commercial projects were mostly focused on drug discovery and development for general medical purposes and his personal congress-supported research (it was mostly done by other researchers of his company) on developing protective preparations for biodefense were minuscule comparing to his commercial work.
  • Dr. Alibek’s opinion about the article in LA Times. After it was published, Dr. Alibek said that he was really surprised with the article published by Mr.David Willman. He says that the most shocking thing was that he did not expect anything like that from a Pulitzer Prize winner. The article was very prejudicial and he did not use any positive and supportive of Dr. Alibek information from his students, his colleagues and government officials who oversaw his research since the information provided by them did not serve his agenda

Publications

Pre-defection

Alibek published more than 80 articles in classified journals on the development of new types of biological weapons and on medical aspects of biodefense prior to his defection to the United States.

Post-defection

Books

  • Alibek, Ken and Steven Handelman (1999), Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It, Random House, ISBN 0-385-33496-6.
  • "The Anthrax Vaccine: Is It safe? Does it Work?" (2002), Reviewer. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Institute of Medicine .
  • Biological Threats and Terrorism: Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities (2002), Workshop Summary, Contributor. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Institute of Medicine .
  • Weinstein, R.S. and K. Alibek (2003), Biological and Chemical Terrorism: A Guide for Healthcare Providers and First Responders, Thieme Medical Publishing, New York.
  • Alibek, K., et al. (2003), Biological Weapons, Bio-Prep, Louisiana, Jan.
  • Fong, I. and K. Alibek (2005),"Bioterrorism and Infectious Agents: A New Dilemma for the 21st Century", Springer.
  • Fong, I. and K. Alibek (2006), New and Evolving Infections of the 21st Century, Springer.

Book chapters

  • ”Firepower in the Lab: Automation in the Fight Against Infectious Diseases and Bioterrorism” (2001), Chapter 15 of Biological Weapons: Past, Present, and Future, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., Institute of Medicine.
  • Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook (2002), Second Edition, F. R. Sidell, W. C. Patrick, T. R. Dashiell, K. Alibek, Jane’s Information Group, Alexandria, VA.
  • K. Alibek, C. Lobanova, "Modulation of Innate Immunity to Protect Against Biological Weapon Threat" (2006), In: Microorganisms and Bioterrorism, Springer.

Monographs

  • Alibek K, Grechaniy L, Klymenko T, Pashkova A. (2008), "Fifth Revolution in Medicine: On the Role of Infections in Pathogenesis of Aging and Chronic Diseases", Lik Sprava, Jan-March issue
  • Alibek K, Grechana T, Grechanyiy L, et al. (2008), Link Between Intestinal Microflora and Gut Immune System: Changes Related to Age, Fiziol ZurJune;3 (54).
  • Alibek K, Klimenko T, et al. (2007), "Viral Carcinogenesis: Current Point of View", Lik Sprava, Jun-Aug issue.
  • Alibek K and A Pashkova (2007), "Infection as a risk factor in the atherosclerosis development: current concepts and treatment opportunities", Lik Sprava, Apr-May;(3):3-13 [In Russian] PMID: 18273960.
  • Alibek K, NV Osipov and SA Nazarenko (2007), "Role of microorganisms in etiology and pathogenesis of aging", Lik Sprava Jan-Mar;(1-2):10-7. [In Russian]
  • Dan Richards, Kenneth Alibek, Michael G Katze, Mark A Wainberg, Richard J Webby "Controversies in 21st century virology" Future Virology, May 2006, Vol. 1, No. 3, Pages 263-268
  • Alibek K and G Liu (2006), "Biodefense shield and avian influenza", Emerg Infect Dis May;12(5):873-5. PMID: 16710964.
  • Karginov VA, A Yohannes, TM Robinson, K Alibek, et al. (2006), "Beta-cyclodextrin derivatives that inhibit anthrax lethal toxin", Bioorg Med Chem Jan 1;14(1):33-40. Epub 2005 Sep 19; PMID: 16169738.
  • Forino M, S Johnson, TY Wong, K. Alibek, et al. (2005), "Efficient synthetic inhibitors of anthrax lethal factor", Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Jul 5;102(27):9499-504. Epub 2005 Jun 27; PMID: 15983377.
  • Popov SG, Popova TG, Hopkins S, K Alibek, et al. (2005), "Effective antiprotease-antibiotic treatment of experimental anthrax", BMC Infect Dis Apr 8;5(1):25. PMID: 15819985
  • Alibek K (2004), "Smallpox: a disease and a weapon", Int J Infect Dis Oct;8 Suppl 2:S3-8. PMID: 15491869
  • Liu G, Q Zhai, D Schaffner, K Alibek, et al. (2004), "Bacillus alcalophilus peptidoglycan induces IFN-alpha-mediated inhibition of vaccinia virus replication" FEMS Immunol Med Microbiol; Oct 1;42(2):197-204; PMID: 15364104.
  • Alibek K, and C Bailey (2004), "BioShield or biogap?", Biosecur Bioterror; 2(2):132-3. PMID: 15225408.
  • Liu G, Q Zhai, DJ Schaffner, K Alibek, et al. (2004), "Prevention of lethal respiratory vaccinia infections in mice with interferon-alpha and interferon-gamma", FEMS Immunol Med Microbiol, Apr 9;40(3):201-6; PMID: 15039095.
  • Liu G, Zhai Q, Schaffner D, K Alibek, et al. (2004), "IL-15 induces IFN-beta and iNOS gene expression, and antiviral activity of murine macrophage RAW 264.7 cells", Immunol Lett, Feb 15;91(2-3):171-8; PMID: 15019287.
  • Popov SG, TG Popova, E Grene, K Alibek, et al. (2004), "Systemic cytokine response in murine anthrax", Cell Microbiol Mar;6(3):225-33; PMID: 14764106.
  • Karginov VA, Robinson TM, Riemenschneider J, K Alibek, et al. (2004), "Treatment of anthrax infection with combination of ciprofloxacin and antibodies to protective antigen of Bacillus anthracis", FEMS Immunol Med Microbiol, Jan 15;40(1):71-4; PMID: 14734189.
  • Wu AG, Alibek D, Li YL, K Alibek, et al. (2003), "Anthrax toxin induces hemolysis: an indirect effect through polymorphonuclear cells", J Infect Dis Oct 15;188(8):1138-41. Epub 2003 Sep 30; PMID: 14551883.
  • Radyuk SN, PA Mericko, TG Popova, K Alibek et al. (2003), "In vitro-generated respiratory mucosa: a new tool to study inhalational anthrax", Biochem Biophys Res Commun Jun 6;305(3):624-32.
  • Klichko VI, J Miller, A Wu, K Alibek, et al. (2003), "Anaerobic induction of Bacillus anthracis hemolytic activity", Biochem Biophys Res Commun Apr 11;303(3):855-62, PMID: 12670489.
  • Popov SG, Villasmil R, Bernardi J, K Alibek, et al. (2002), "Effect of Bacillus anthracis lethal toxin on human peripheral blood mononuclear cells", FEBS Lett Sep 11;527(1-3):211-5, PMID: 12220662.
  • Popov SG, Villasmil R, Bernardi J, K Alibek, et al. (2002), "Lethal toxin of Bacillus anthracis causes apoptosis of macrophages", Biochem Biophys Res Commun Apr 26;293(1):349-55, PMID: 12054607.
  • K. Alibek, Bioterrorism Threat in Modern World, Abstract of presentation to the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, New York, 2002.
  • K. Alibek, Mighty Microbe, Defense Review, Pg. 44, Autumn, 2001.
  • K. Alibek, Biological Weapons: Threat and Defense. Abstract of presentation to the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, Davos, Switzerland, 2000.
  • Alibek K (1999), "The Soviet Union's anti-agricultural biological weapons", Ann N Y Acad Sci 894:18-9, PMID: 10681964.
  • K. Alibek, Behind the mask: biological warfare, Perspective, Volume IX, Number 1, September-October 1998.

Op-Eds

Selected Congressional Testimony

See also

References

  1. ↑ www.max-well.com
  2. ↑ Anderson, D. (2006), Lessons Learned from the Former Soviet Biological Warfare Program; UMI Dissertation Services, UMI NO. 3231331
  3. ↑ Anderson (2006), Op. cit.
  4. ↑ Anderson (2006), Op. cit.
  5. ↑ Anderson (2006), Op. cit.
  6. ↑ Anderson (2006), Op. cit.
  7. ↑ Alibek, Ken and Stephen Handelman (1999), Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It, Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6 [1]
  8. ↑ AFG Biosolutions
  9. ↑ Willman, David (2007), “Selling the Threat of Bioterrorism”, The Los Angeles Times, 1 July 2007.
  10. ↑ "Random Samples", Science, 11 October 2002: Vol. 298. no. 5592, p. 359
  11. ↑ Willman, Op. cit
  12. ↑ Willman, Op. cit.

See also:

fr:Ken Alibek pl:Ken Alibek ru:Алибеков, Канатжан Байзакович

Retrieved from "http://ssf.f15ijp.com/wiki/index.php?title=Ken_Alibek&oldid=42854"