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"Preemptive strike" redirects here. For other meanings, see Preemptive strike (disambiguation).
In political rhetoric, "preemptive war" may also be used to refer to preventive war.

Preemptive war (or a preemptive strike) is waged in an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived inevitable offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (allegedly unavoidable) war before that threat materializes. Preemptive war can be often confused with the term preventive war. The difference is that a preventive war is launched to destroy the potential threat of an enemy, when an attack by that party is not imminent or known to be planned, while a preemptive war is launched in anticipation of immediate enemy aggression.[1] Most contemporary scholarship equates preventive war with aggression, and therefore argues that it is illegitimate.[2] Preemption is more widely accepted as legitimate and prudent.[3] As early as 1625, Hugo Grotius characterized a state's right of self-defense to include the right to forcibly forestall an attack.[4]

Classical approach

In a classical approach, self-defense is restricted to a response to an armed attack, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.[5] However, following the practice of states an imminent threat emanating from neighbouring state or disturbances by enemy forces from foreign territory may justify preemptive attack. Legal experts refer to the Caroline affair of 1837 when British forces in Canada crossed the United States border and killed several Canadian rebels and one American citizen who were preparing an offensive against the British in Canada. The United States rejected the legal ground of the Caroline case. In 1842, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster pointed out that the necessity for forcible reaction must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." This formulation is part of the Caroline test, which "is broadly cited as enshrining the appropriate customary law standard".[6]

Sofaer's four elements

The scholar Abraham D. Sofaer identifies four key elements for justification of preemption:[7]

  1. The nature and magnitude of the threat involved;
  2. The likelihood that the threat will be realized unless preemptive action is taken;
  3. The availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force; and
  4. Whether using preemptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the U.N. Charter and other applicable international agreements.

Walzer's three elements

Professor Mark R. Amstutz (citing Michael Walzer) adopts a similar but slightly varied set of criteria and notes three factors when evaluating the justification of a preemptive strike.[8]

  1. The existence of an intention to injure;
  2. The undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger; and
  3. The need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk.

Intention

The intention with a preemptive strike is to gain the advantage of initiative and to harm the enemy at a moment of minimal protection, for instance while vulnerable during transport or mobilization.

While the labeling of an attack (on strategic and tactical levels) seldom is controversial, it is much more so in regard to the initiation of a war.

Examples

The Six-Day War, which began when Israel launched a successful attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967, has been widely described as a preemptive war[9][10][11][12] and is, according to the United States State Department, "perhaps the most cited example [of preemption]."[13] Others have alternatively referred to it as a preventive war.[14] Some have referred to the war as an act of “interceptive self-defense.”[15] According to this view, though no single Egyptian step may have qualified as an armed attack, Egypt’s collective actions made clear that she was bent on armed attack against Israel.[16] At least one source has suggested that it does not meet the Caroline test.[17]

File:F-16netz002.jpg
Israeli Air Force F-16A Netz with 6.5 aerial victory marks and Osirak bombing mark

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 has been cited as an example of the use of preemptive force. In response to a Soviet military buildup in Cuba, the United States imposed a “defensive quarantine” around the island. Since there was no actual attack from Cuba or the Soviets, the U.S. military action in this regard was deemed an act of pre-emptive self defense.[18]

The Israeli attack and destruction of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 has been cited as an act of preemption where Israel exercised its right of anticipatory self-defense. Israel believed that a nuclear attack against its civilian population was highly likely if Iraq was allowed to develop nuclear weapons.[19] This is a minority view, since international law experts were nearly unanimous in that Israel acted illegally. [20] The United Nations Security Council denounced the attack as destabilizing and illegal. [21] However, Professor of International Law Anthony D’Amato notes that while Israel was condemned for the action, the Security Council resolution was not accompanied by any sanction. He believes that despite the resolution’s strong wording, the international community was in fact, “applauding” Israel’s attack.[22]

The Soviet Union's aerial attack on Finland on June 25, 1941, as an answer to the German attack on Russia of June 22 (Operation Barbarossa leading to the Great Patriotic War), can be argued to be an example of such a preemptive attack, although the bombing of residential districts has to be attributed a psychological aim rather than a tactical. Finland's army was mobilized and prepared for both defence and attack, its government had declared its intention to remain outside of the war, and its parliament was assembled to confirm the status of nonbelligerence when attacked.reference

The Kosovo War was used as an example by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in his first description of his Doctrine of International Community, made in his speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, Illinois on April 24, 1999.[23][24]

Also, The Bush Doctrine, first explained in the president's commencement speech to the graduating class of the U.S. Military Academy on June 1, 2002 in West Point, New York states that it is the policy of the United States that "preemptive war" or even preventive war may be waged in appropriate circumstances.

File:P-2H Neptune over Soviet ship Oct 1962.jpg
A U.S. Navy P-2H Neptune of VP-18 flying over Soviet freighter Kasimov with crated Il-28s on deck during the Cuban Missile Crisis

The 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, and the 1940 German invasion of Norway have been argued to be preemptive, with the German defense in the Nuremberg trials in 1946 arguing that Germany was "compelled to attack Norway by the need to forestall an Allied invasion and that her action was therefore preemptive."[25] The German defence was referring to Plan R 4 and its predecessors. Norway was vital to Germany as a transport route for iron ore from Sweden, a supply that Britain was determined to stop. One adopted British plan was to go through Norway and occupy cities in Sweden.[26][27] An Allied invasion was ordered on March 12, and the Germans intercepted radio traffic setting March 14 as deadline for the preparation.[28] Peace in Finland interrupted the Allied plans, but Hitler became, rightly, convinced that the Allies would try again, and ordered operation Weseruebung. The new Allied plans were Wilfred and Plan R 4. The plan was to provoke a German reaction by laying mines in Norwegian waters, and once Germany showed signs of taking action UK troops would occupy Narvik, Trondheim and Bergen and launch a raid on Stavanger to destroy Sola airfield. However "the mines were not laid until the morning of 8 April, by which time the German ships were advancing up the Norwegian coast."[29] However The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg determined that no Allied invasion was imminent, and therefore rejected the German argument that Germany was entitled to attack Norway.[30]

Legality

Further information: War of aggression, Jus ad bellum, and UN Charter

There is some question as to the legality of this doctrine under international law. Article 2, Section 4 of the U.N. Charter is generally considered to be 'jus cogens', or a peremptory norm which cannot be violated. It bars the threat or use of force against any state in the absence of an acute and imminent actual threat. At the same time, however, Article 51 clearly permits self defense. The tension between these two principles is evident in the doctrine of preemptive war, which claims to be defensive, yet does not come in response to an attack. Article 51 is not a blank check for the use of force in self defense. As Daniel Webster said, the necessity for forcible reaction must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."

See also

External links

References

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cs:Preventivní útok

de:Präventivdoktrin fa:جنگ پیش‌دستانه it:Guerra preventiva he:מכה מקדימה

pl:Wojna prewencyjna
  1. ↑ Beres, Louis Rene (1991–1992), On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20, Hofstra L. Rev., p. 321 
  2. ↑ Shue, Henry and Rhodin, David (2007). Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification. Oxford University Press. p. 116. ISBN 978-0199233137
  3. ↑ Shue and Rodin 2007, p. 118.
  4. ↑ Beres, Louis R. (1991), Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination during Peace and War, The, 5, Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J., p. 231 
  5. ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'Module:Citation/CS1/Suggestions' not found.
  6. ↑ Duffy, Helen (2005). The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law. Cambridge University Press. p. 157.ISBN 978-0521547352
  7. ↑ Abraham D. Sofaer. On the Necessity of Pre-emption. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 14 No. 2, 2003, p.220 [1]
  8. ↑ Mark R. Amstutz, International ethics: concepts, theories, and cases in global politics
  9. ↑ The Six Day War is, "A classic example of preemptive war." Henry Shue, David Rodin Preemption: military action and moral justification
  10. ↑ "Classic examples of preemptive wars include the July Crisis of 1914 and the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israel preemptively attacked Egypt…" Karl P. Mueller Striking first: preemptive and preventive attack in U.S. national security
  11. ↑ “The Six Day War between Israel and alliance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq was an example of preemption.” And, “It exemplifies preemption.” Charles W. Kegley, Gregory A. Raymond The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics
  12. ↑ "Preemptive attack is morally justified when three conditions are fulfilled: The existence of an intention to injure, the undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger, and the need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk. Since these conditions were met in Israel’s Six Day War, Israel’s preemptive attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967 was a legitimate act of self-defense.” Mark R. Amstutz International ethics: concepts, theories, and cases in global politics
  13. ↑ “The United States has often walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. In fact there have only been a handful of clear-cut cases of military preemption by any states in the last 200 years. (Israeli preemption in the Six Day War of 1967 is perhaps the most cited example)” U.S. National Security Strategy: a New Era U.S. Department of State (2002)
  14. ↑ Choice or Necessity (New York Times, May 8, 2009)
  15. ↑ Distein, Yoram, War, aggression and self-defense p. 192, Cambridge University Press (2005)
  16. ↑ Id
  17. ↑ "The closest case that might have, but is now regarded as not having met the Caroline test, was Israel's first strike against Egypt in 1967. Few regarded it as a good example of a permissible anticipatory attack under the Caroline test, especially after it became clear following the attack that there was no overwhelming threat that justified the attack to ensure Israel's survival." Gathii, James Thuo. Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of Preemptive War Under the Doctrine of Sources. Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 1-34, 2005.
  18. ↑ VYTAUTAS KACERAUSKIS, CAN A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNILATERALLY DECIDE TO USE PREEMPTIVE FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER STATE WITHOUT VIOLATING THEUN CHARTER? INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BALTIC LAW Volume 2, No. 1 (January, 2005) ISSN 1648-9349
  19. ↑ VYTAUTAS KACERAUSKIS, CAN A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNILATERALLY DECIDE TO USE PREEMPTIVE FORCE AGAINST ANOTHER STATE WITHOUT VIOLATING THEUN CHARTER? INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BALTIC LAW Volume 2, No. 1 (January, 2005) ISSN 1648-9349
  20. ↑ Israel's Air Strike Against The Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective (Anthony Amato) p. 2
  21. ↑ United Nations Security Council Resolution S-RES-487(1981) on 19 June 1981 (retrieved 2007-08-10)
  22. ↑ Kacerauskis p. 96
  23. ↑ Prime Minister's speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago 10 Downing Street, April 24, 1999
  24. ↑ The Blair Doctrine PBS NewsHour, April 22, 1999
  25. ↑ Myres Smith McDougal, Florentino P. Feliciano, "The international law of war: transnational coercion and world public order" p 211, 212
  26. ↑ "COMMAND DECISIONS", CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000. URL p. 59 "The British plan which was adopted was more modest. While ostensibly intended to bring Allied troops to the Finnish front, it laid its main emphasis on operations in northern Norway and Sweden. The main striking force was to land at Narvik and advance along the railroad to its eastern terminus at Lulea, occupying Kiruna and Gallivare along the way. By late April two Allied brigades were to be established along that line."
  27. ↑ "COMMAND DECISIONS", CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000. URL p. 66, 67 "The British held back two divisions from France, intending to put them into the field in Norway, and planned to expand their force eventually to 100,000 men. The French intended to commit about 50,000. The British and French staffs agreed that the latter half of March would be the best time for going into Norway;"
  28. ↑ "COMMAND DECISIONS", CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000. URL p.67,68 "The objectives were to take Narvik, the railroad, and the Swedish ore fields;" "an intercepted radio message setting 14 March as the deadline for preparation of transport groups indicated that the Allied operation was getting under way. But another message, intercepted on the 15th, ordering the submarines to disperse revealed that the peace [in Finland] had disrupted the Allied plan."
  29. ↑ "COMMAND DECISIONS", CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000. URL p. 68
  30. ↑ Jus ad Bellum: Law Regulating Resort to Force
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